Republics of the New World

THE REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL EXPERIMENT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY LATIN AMERICA

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Introduction

A GREAT POLITICAL commotion marked the beginning of the nineteenth century across the Spanish empire. Napoleon's occupation of the Iberian Peninsula shattered imperial unity and inaugurated a long history of political change on both sides of the Atlantic. In the Americas, most of the former colonial territories entered into a period of reformulation of the colonial links that ended in independence, followed by a vast, lengthy, and intricate process of redefinition of sovereignties and formation of new polities. Attempts at nation building followed different directions, and many a project was tried and failed, while no linear or predetermined path led to the fifteen individual nation-states in place by the end of the second half of that century.

There was, however, a common denominator to that complex process: the polities in the making, the short- and the long-lived alike, all adopted forms of government based on the principle of popular sovereignty. Spanish America was, therefore, part of the larger history that involved the English, the American, and the French revolutions, the foundation of constitutional monarchies, the invention of a federal republic in

the United States and of other republican regimes in Europe, and—above all—the institution of the sovereignty of the people as a founding principle of the political. These developments shattered the edifice of the ancien régime in various parts of the world where, from then on, the political no longer referred to a transcendent instance but was considered a human construct. The making of the Spanish American republics belongs to this broader picture. Until a short while ago, however, this experience remained marginal to the mainstream narratives of political modernity that revolved around the northern Europe–United States axis. By introducing Spanish America into this story of political transformation, this book joins the work of other scholars who, in recent years, have adopted a more global approach in order to widen the scope of those narratives.

Popular sovereignty marked the way to modernity, but within that framework two main regime options were available: the constitutional monarchy and the republic. At a time when most of the Western modern polities endorsed the former, the Americas, both North and South, and with the sole exception of Brazil, opted for the republic. There was no single republican model, and the label applies to a wide variety of ventures across the continent, but all of them entailed a radical innovation in the ways of instituting the polity and of legitimating authority. If the former Spanish territories were not original in their move toward popular sovereignty, their adoption of republican formulas tried on a vast scale was unparalleled outside the United States, and it inaugurated a decades-long history of political experimentation in the ways of the republic. The purpose of this book is to reflect upon this vast and long-term "republican experiment"[1] in Spanish America as part of the broader political transformations experienced during the nineteenth century in a global context. It also

seeks to illuminate that larger process under a new light, and thus contribute to reshape the overall history of republics and republicanism.

The Adventure of Self-Government

By the mid-1820s, all of continental Spanish America had left behind the colonial condition and entered into a new political era, marked by the adoption of popular sovereignty as the founding principle of the polity and of the republic as the favored form of government. This implied a radical change at the level of what Pierre Rosanvallon has called "the political," that is, "the modality of existence of life in common,"[2] a change that in this case meant a complex transit from a social order consisting of natural or God-made communities and corporations that integrated the body of the kingdom to a secular, nontranscendent, man-made, self-instituted polity. This transit was not a straight road, but rather a winding path of irregular trajectory and unpredictable ending. Nevertheless, the decisions—that proved final—to replace the divine right of kings and to dismiss the constitutional monarchy alternative set the stage for the new, that is, for the successive experiences in republican self-government. Yet these experiences were themselves subject to the uncertainties and tensions of a self-instituted "life in common," which triggered an open-ended process for decades to come.

The founders of the new polities faced two main challenges. First, how to reconstruct political authority on the bases of popular sovereignty. This was both a theoretical and a very practical matter that, throughout most of the century, found various, always partial, solutions. Second, how to define the human and territorial contours of the polities that were to be

the sources of that sovereign power as well as the domains for its application. The severance of the colonial bond had led to the formal erasure of the old territorial division characteristic of the imperial institutional arrangements. Yet the initial proposals to create a single "nation" did not prosper, and the following decades witnessed the drafting and redrafting of new boundaries, and therefore, the shaping and reshaping of the polities. The vicissitudes of this story owed as much to the colonial legacy as to the challenges of the postcolonial era, and their traces were still visible in the relatively stable pattern of republics-cum-nations that crystallized by the second half of the nineteenth century.

The focus of this book relates to the first of these questions, that is, to the problem of the creation and legitimation of political authority in Spanish America. The adoption of republican forms of government entailed a radical change in the foundations of power and the "invention of the people"—to borrow the term used by Edmund Morgan in his seminal book on Britain and the United States.[3] Besides this simple yet indispensable initial platform, there were no fixed formats or universal protocols that defined a republic, so that actual republics could and did vary greatly throughout the century.

Despite this variability, and the social, economic, and cultural diversity of the Spanish American territories, the polities that took shape across its variegated geography show common patterns and trends of political organization that defined a distinct republican order that lasted for more than five decades. This order was in flux, but it revolved around certain recognizable principles and institutions common to most of these republics until roughly the 1870s. The problems they had to face were often similar, as were some of the directions they followed to solve them. They also found common inspiration in the available republican examples and ideological traditions.

In their initial drive toward self-government, the postindependence leaderships were well aware of the broader connections of local events, and were committed to what they perceived as the larger struggle on behalf of modernity. They were also strongly influenced by the political traditions and developments beyond the region. The United States featured in a prominent place, but other historical cases appealed in various ways to the founding fathers and their successors: the classical republics—particularly Rome—the Italian early modern city-states, the United Provinces of the Netherlands (late sixteenth to late seventeenth century), and revolutionary France, plus the prestigious English constitutional monarchy and the short liberal experiences in Spain (1812, and 1820 to 1823). These external examples remained a source of reference for the rest of the century, together with a widespread awareness of the Brazilian case—a neighbor constitutional monarchy subject to both praises and critique. But the locals did not mimic any of the existing models; rather, they adapted and innovated, adopted or rejected external influences according to their own legacies and experiences. In short, they followed their own ways, and although criticism ran high in certain periods and places, the search for solutions to the actual political problems did not lead them to fundamentally challenge the republic. Unlike what happened in several European cases that opted out of their republican regimes, Spanish Americans stuck to them for good.

In their search for inspiration in the ways of the republic, they also resorted to the available pool of changing ideas and values in circulation. They could find it in the republicanism of the ancients and in the more recent forms of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century French and Italian republican thought or of Anglo Saxon civic humanism, as well as in the various and successive formulations of what came to be known as

"liberalism." Also, they could turn to the doctrine of natural rights, from Grotius to Vattel, and to different strands of the Catholic tradition. The echoes of socialist thinkers reverberated in several places after the midcentury, when also positivism gained an increasing presence in most of the region. These ideological lineages provided a shared background whose elements were usually combined in very eclectic ways, shaping original political languages whose main concepts were strongly rooted in the current political contexts.

This changing repertoire provided different and sometimes conflicting orientations for the formulation and reformulation of norms, institutions, and practices that shaped the political life of the republics. Yet innovations in this regard resulted mainly from the concrete political experience of self-government, which turned out to be a risky undertaking with unpredictable effects. In that context, contemporaries sought different ways to produce and reproduce power and authority within the framework of the republic. They tried various normative and institutional alternatives, and devised mechanisms to channel the participation of the "sovereign people"—whose definition was itself controversial. This process of experimentation resulted from a combination of very conscious exercises in innovation and the unpredictable effects of political action, so that the consequences usually went well beyond the wishes and expectations of the main actors of the political game.

By the midcentury, most of the nations-in-the-making had established certain institutional and normative thresholds devised to stabilize the political system, such as the affirmation of individual rights and freedoms, the regulation of government powers, and the explicit demarcation of citizenship. For most of the period, however, political life remained highly volatile. Instability, in fact, proved to be an inbred feature of these

republican regimes—as we shall see throughout this book. And although concerns regarding the difficulties to achieve a more predictable political order were commonplace, only by the last decades of the century did they amount to an overall challenge to the prevailing republican values and practices, which led to decisive changes in the rules of the game and inaugurated a new political era that best fitted in the dawning global age of nationalism and imperialism.

Points of Departure

Scholars have long discussed the characteristics of nineteenth-century Spanish American politics. For years, they considered its pervasive volatility as a symptom of the "failed" modernization of the new polities, where liberalism could not set foot on account of different factors, from colonial heritage to premodern forms of resistance. This literature produced some of the more compelling interpretations of the Latin American past that are still persuasive and highly influential. In recent years, however, historians are leaving behind the teleological perspectives that informed those views, and rather than seek to measure the actual history of the area in terms of the liberal canon, or try to detect obstacles presumably obstructing the road to progress, they are now exploring how politics actually functioned then and there. Liberalism itself has been revisited, as well as the conventional narratives of its all-encompassing influence in the construction of political modernity in the United States and other Western nations. No longer considered to be an exception, Latin American political history is understood in its own terms and as part of that wider story. From this fresh angle, the issue of the instability of nineteenth-century politics may be addressed anew as part of the history of the republic, not only in Spanish America.

Recent scholarship has also left behind a second powerful view of that history, which considered nineteenth-century politics exclusively as an elite affair that kept the rest of the population aside or barely included on the margins. Historians now claim, to the contrary, that the shaping of the Spanish American republics involved not just elites and would-be elites; it implicated larger sectors of the population in politically significant forms of organization and action. It has shown how people from different walks of life mobilized in large numbers and became involved in the political life of the new polities in the making. In this regard, Spanish America shares some of the main traits of political modernization in other areas, while at the same time it shows specific features that account for the intensity of its politics during most of the nineteenth century.

This vibrant scholarship is my point of departure.[4] Latin American historiography has profited immensely from the recent revival and renovation of political history. In the last twenty to thirty years, the number of books, articles, and dissertations in the field has been larger than all the earlier production put together. This expanding corpus has succeeded in changing our former views of politics and the political in nineteenth-century Latin America. The studies cover a wider range of topics, regions, and periods; they display various methodological perspectives and put forward different interpretations. Most of them deal with national, regional, or local cases, although there is an increasing tendency to include transnational comparisons not just within Latin America but also considering other areas of the world.

I also rely heavily on the theoretical and historical scholarship that studies republicanism, citizenship, the public sphere, revolutions, and more generally, nineteenth-century politics beyond Spanish America. This literature has also offered new concepts and insights in the last decades, and it has allowed me

to think the problems I am concerned with in comparative perspective. Moreover, this study has given me the opportunity to deploy theoretical and empirical inputs that come from different sources and combine them in order to make sense of the overall republican experience.

Itinerary

In the light of these theoretical and historiographical references, this book explores what I have called "the republican experiment" by delving into a crucial component of politics in the republics: the relationship between people and government that developed after the adoption of popular sovereignty as a founding principle of power. While most of the current literature is concerned with particular countries or regions, and chooses to focus either on the elites and would-be-elites or on the popular classes (in some formulations, the "subaltern"), this book points to the common traits and shared tendencies in the relationships established *between* "the many and the few" across Spanish America in the period of the 1820s to 1870s.

In order to reflect upon how power and authority were redefined in the republican era, I seek the commonalities among very different societies through a long period of time; therefore, the differences—which of course are many—are concealed or minimized. Moreover, not all areas of Spanish America are equally covered by the existing literature, so that my interpretations are surely biased in the direction of the countries most favored by it. In this regard, I have decided to limit my arguments to continental Spanish America, thus leaving aside the islands of the Caribbean, which offer a rather different trajectory.

The chosen time span, in turn, has allowed me to conflate these experiences, as it leaves behind the highly conflictive

and heterogeneous processes of independence to concentrate on the core decades of the republican thrust, and ends when that thrust waned in the face of new formulas and actions toward the consolidation of nation-states. For roughly five decades after independence, I find a shared pattern in the ways of the republic, particularly as regards the main topic of this book.

The people were at the center of the adventure of self-government, so a great part of the history of the new republics is tied to the ways in which this abstract principle was made effective in the institution and reproduction of the polity. And the people are also at the center of this book, but rather than attempting an overall consideration of this multidimensional object, I follow a more limited approach and focus primarily on the normative frameworks, institutional setups, and actual practices involving the people of the Spanish American republics from the 1820s to the 1870s. Three dimensions of the political life of the period offer a privileged point of entry to explore that relationship: elections, armed citizenship and the militia, and "public opinion." These by no means exhaust the possible ways of addressing the chosen topic, but they were spheres of political discourse and action crucial to the forging of politics in the republics. Therefore, the central part of this book explores how these instances worked as arenas for the definition, action, and representation of the people, as well as for the construction and legitimation of power. From there, I go on to discuss the formation of the modern polity, the changing contours of citizenship, the dynamics of politics, and other key features of the Spanish American republican experiment from the aftermath of independence to the last decades of the century. In connecting these developments to the global context and particularly to other republican experiences, I hope to illuminate that larger history from a fresh perspective.

Chapter 1 presents the Latin American scenario at the time of the imperial crisis that plunged the former colonies of Spain and Portugal into a succession of events with unforeseen consequences. There is a very rich literature that discusses Napoleon's occupation of the Iberian Peninsula in the context of the struggles for domination among the main European powers, as well as its multiple consequences for the Iberian empires both at home and overseas. With this historiographical background, the chapter focuses on the final outcome for the American mainland territories under imperial rule: their independence from their metropolis and the subsequent disputes around conflicting sovereignties. Secondly, it discusses the available options of political organization after the severance of the colonial bond, and the choices made in this regard, which led Spanish America in the republican path while Brazil became a constitutional monarchy. The challenges posed by the adoption of republican forms of self-government are at the center of the rest of this chapter, which focuses on the attempts at reconstructing political power on the basis of popular sovereignty and on the final controversial decision to introduce modern representation as the appropriate way to create legitimate authority. This decision opened the way to the definition of different dimensions of political citizenship that will be the main theme of the following three chapters.

Chapter 2 revolves around one of the key mechanisms devised to materialize representation: regular elections. Suffrage, elections, and electoral practices are discussed here in tune with a vast recent scholarship on this subject that has radically changed the former prevailing views on the right to vote and the role of elections both in the dynamics of political struggle and in the relationships between "the many and the few." The Spanish American record and performance in such matters were not very different from those of other contemporary

republics; if anything, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the former reveal more systematic widespread electoral participation than was the case in most west European countries. The right of suffrage was widely extended among the male population, and although not all potential voters actually attended the polls, those who did came from a wide social spectrum. Electoral machines, in turn, show striking similarities all over the Atlantic world, where partisan organization and competition often set the pace of practical politics. Despite the controversies often raised around Spanish American elections, for most of the period, these were the main legitimate road to government posts, and they offer a key to understand the politics of the republic.

As the ultimate source of power, the people were not only in charge of electing governments but also of controlling them regularly. While the periodical exercise of the suffrage could be considered a means of checking chosen representatives, the regular control of those elected rested mainly in the hands of public opinion, on the one side, and of the citizens in arms, on the other. Chapter 3 focuses on the latter. Today we are familiar with the role of the former in our democracies, but armed citizenship is no longer mentioned as a valid means of keeping government power in check. For most of the nineteenth century, however, it was an important aspect of republican regimes—not only in Spanish America.

As guardians of popular sovereignty, citizens had the right and the obligation to defend freedom and to bear arms in the face of any abuses of power. Although this was an individual right, its effective exercise was channeled through the institution of the militia. The chapter analyzes the creation and transformation of the militia—in its different formats, including the national guard—as well as its relationships with the professional army. It discusses the fragmentation of military power, and the role both institutions played in politics. As the material

incarnation of armed citizenship, the militia was considered a genuine political player; it intervened in times of elections and performed important functions in the civic rituals of the republic. Above all, it was a decisive player in revolutions. The use of force was deemed legitimate against abuses of government power, so that revolutions (in various forms) became a regular and frequent means to challenge the existing authorities on the charge of alleged despotism. This chapter ends with a discussion of this distinctive form of political action. In contrast with a long scholarly tradition of considering revolutions as a typically Spanish American premodern form of resistance, I argue that they were part and parcel of the new, of the practices developed during the era of the republic, not only in this part of the world.

Public opinion is the focus of chapter 4. The adoption of popular sovereignty and representative government introduced a dimension to politics that was increasingly referred to as "public opinion," the voice of the people that was to exert control over those in power. This concept was widely used at the time, and it had changing meanings, but it was central to the republican rhetoric and procedures of the nineteenth century. This chapter concentrates on the institutions and practices connected to public opinion, such as the periodical press, the associative movement, and other instances of public action. The study of the Spanish American case adds new insights to the current theoretical and historical debates around Habermas's theory of *Öffentlichkeit*, and provides new evidence for exploring the ways in which civil and political society articulated in republican contexts.

The last chapter puts together the different dimensions explored in the previous three, and advances an interpretation of the shaping of the Spanish American republics, with focus on the relationships between the people and government, and the boundaries of inclusion in and exclusion from the polity. The

introduction of popular sovereignty and the adoption of republican forms of government changed the scale of politics, and it opened the way to the development of a vigorous political life that involved large sectors of the population in the creation and legitimation of power. The chapter first concentrates on the two protagonists of republican politics, the "ruling few" and the "many," and refers to their respective collective profiles and the main venues of political involvement, as well as to the transformations thereof. It then goes on to discuss the creation and development of partisan formal and informal networks that articulated participation through elaborate material and symbolic means and gave shape to a highly inclusive yet unequal and strongly hierarchical political life. Competition and conflict were the engines of politics, whose internal dynamics—I argue—was marked by an inborn instability, fueled by republican values and practices. For decades, this feature did not get in the way of the legitimacy of the system, which proved quite efficient in shaping authority and delivering political rule. In the last quarter of the century, however, this prevailing order entered into a critical phase, and the chapter finishes with an overview of the incoming changes that led the way to the political novelties of the fin de siècle.

Finally, a short epilogue reflects on some of the main trends of the nineteenth-century republican experiment in Spanish America in the context of the overall history of modern republics.

Landscape

At the time of independence, the territories that had been part of the Spanish empire in the Americas had many things in common. For starters: three hundred years under the same colonial rule, which meant the social organization under the

premises of a corporate and hierarchical society of orders, the political subordination to the rules of the absolute Spanish monarchy, and the economic dependence upon the imperial needs. Also, they were all under the cultural and spiritual determinant power of the Catholic Church, which had strong economic and social connotations. But there were also many differences among those territories, from the geographical settings to the resource endowment, the population size and composition, and the actual social structure. Even certain features that may seem analogous at first sight soon reveal their disparities. Such is the case, for example, of the multiethnic configuration of the population that was common to all areas, but had, at the same time, marked regional differences. Thus, at the heart of the Andean region as well as in central Mexico, over 60 percent of the population was classified as indigenous—itself a highly heterogeneous category—a figure that was much lower in the Southern Cone as well as in Colombia, Venezuela, and parts of Central America. Blacks—most of them slaves—were strongly represented in the areas around the Caribbean basin and in some parts of the Pacific coast. The numbers of mestizos and mulattoes was also variable, as was the figure for "blancos."

The imperial crisis brought about decisive changes in Spanish America. First of all, there was large-scale war: more than fifteen years of armed confrontations—not only against Spanish domination but also to solve internal conflicts—all of which dislocated the established economic and social organization. The severance of the colonial bond further affected the previous order, so that by the aftermath of independence, the former Spanish territories in America had entered a new era. There was, in the first place, the radical innovation in the political sphere discussed above and in the rest of this book. There was, also, a succession of territorial rearrangements and, for several decades, the actual boundaries of the polities in the

MAP 1. Spanish America: Political division circa 1800

making were in flux (see maps 1, 2, and 3). The economy, in turn, experienced an important reorientation due to the end of the colonial demands and restrictions, which meant the redefinition of internal circuits as well as the opening up to the international markets. Changes in the social and cultural

MAP 2. Spanish America: Political division circa 1830

landscapes happened more gradually, and colonial legacies coexisted with the new values, institutions, and practices for decades to come.

The impact of these developments varied greatly across Spanish America, so that the nations already defined by mid-

MAP 3. Spanish America: Political division circa 1900

century showed significant differences in their social and economic structures, which came even more visible in the following decades. All of these countries increased their connections with the world market and their dependence toward the financial and commercial dominating powers thereof—first among

them, England. They produced primary goods for export, and imported most of the manufactures and the capital required for growth. But this equation varied greatly according to the resource endowment, the structure of production, and the size of the internal markets, among other factors, so that, for example, countries like Argentina and Colombia could better profit from the situation than others with less favorable conditions, like Bolivia. Nevertheless, all of them experienced the vulnerability of their dependent condition and subordinate place in the world economy.

The social landscape was also diverse. By the end of the nineteenth century, population size ranged from over twelve million in Mexico to around two to four million in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, to below two million in the rest (Bolivia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay). Areas with strong European immigration, such as Argentina and Uruguay, had experienced the highest rates of growth, while the rest had more or less multiplied their population by two to three in sixty years. An increasing process of *mestizaje* contributed to modify the ethnic profiles of most countries, which nevertheless kept their initial basic patterns. The early eradication of the colonial caste system did not erase the many deeply ingrained forms of discrimination against indigenous peoples, while the dismantling of slavery took several decades with initial steps to stop the trade and free the newborn, with abolition usually coming later.

Most of the people lived in the countryside, and although urbanization accelerated in the last decades of the century, the majority of Spanish Americans qualified as rural residents. These were mostly illiterate peasants or workers employed in low-skilled jobs. Literacy rates were higher in the towns and cities, where schooling expanded after the midcentury, to-

gether with jobs in manufacturing and the service sector that required certain qualifications on the part of the salaried labor force and the self-employed. Unskilled hands were still an important presence among urban workers, a fact that increased the differentiation within the popular classes. The expansion of a middling sector was characteristic of late nineteenth-century cities and in some rural areas, a feature that was more significant in some countries than in others.

Spanish American societies were strongly hierarchical, but the sharp distinction between the so-called *gente decente* or *hombres de bien*—a vague denomination that connoted possession of material assets and symbolic capital—and the plebeian rest, typical of the first half of the century, gave way to a newly stratified social structure. The image of an overall concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of a small and closed class of powerful families may apply to some specific cases and periods, but in many others—and especially in the larger countries—it fails to account for the dynamism of these societies where the powerful one day could be successfully challenged the next. Within the context of a nonlinear transition from a basically traditional mercantile structure of production to one increasingly marked by capitalism, the upper classes were subject to the risks and hazards posed by the new demands of the system. This transformation did not diminish or eliminate social difference; on the contrary, it opened the way to a renewed process of stratification legitimized by the new creed of individual self-realization and the ideology of personal progress, typical of the fin de siècle.

By then, little was left of the Spanish America that broke its ties with the empire. We may even doubt of the pertinence of conflating this whole area with its fifteen different, very heterogeneous nations in a single collective. So why does this book wade into such dubious waters? In this case, I made the choice

at the end of the road, when I realized how much of what I thought specific of the political history of Argentina was actually part of a larger story, one that led me beyond its frontiers to the transnational scene. While trying to make sense of the local in a global context, I found more: that the nineteenth-century political developments in the River Plate belonged to the Spanish American experience of the republic and to the wider history of political modernity. So it is to that experience that this book now turns.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Republican Experiment

AN ESSAY IN INTERPRETATION

AFTER THE SEVERANCE of the colonial links with Spain, the adoption of republican forms of government based on the principle of popular sovereignty brought about important changes in the ways of defining and legitimating political power and authority in the American territories of the former empire, and inaugurated a decades' long history of political experimentation. The introduction of representative government entailed the definition and redefinition of the actual role of the sovereign people, of the relationships between that people and government, and of the boundaries of inclusion in and exclusion from the polity. The exploration of three dimensions of political life as it developed in the new republics in the making, I have argued, may throw some light on how those relationships and boundaries were defined and changed over time. Across Spanish America, throughout the nineteenth century, elections, armed citizenship, and public opinion became pillars in the construction and legitimization of authority. The norms, institutions, and practices associated with them were central

to play the game of power, and although they were not the only pieces in that game, they referred to a crucial aspect of the republican regimes: political power involved not just the elites and would-be elites, it implicated larger sectors of the population in significant forms of organization and action.

To compete for and reach office, whether by peaceful or violent means, the few had to resort to the many. That political formula remained constant throughout the nineteenth century, although both its terms and the relationship between them were always changing. By exploring the main spheres that materialized that relationship, we have illuminated how each of them worked and who were the political actors involved. This chapter will, in turn, propose to articulate these partial pictures into an overall interpretation of the republican experiment in Spanish America. It will first address the question of the political actors—who were the few and the many of our story—and then move to the engine of the political life of the period: the dynamics of competition and conflict.

"The Ruling Few"[1]

Historian Tulio Halperin Donghi coined the revealing term "career of the revolution" to refer to the opportunities for "public service" and "individual advancement" opened during and after the transition from colony to republic for men of personal and political ambitions. In a groundbreaking study centered on the former Viceroyalty of the River Plate, he traced the steps that led to the formation of a new political leadership in the aftermath of the revolution of 1810.[2] In the midst of the uncertainties and innovations of that period, political life broke its former limits that, albeit always in flux, had served to keep struggles for power restricted within the parameters imposed by imperial rule. The collapse of the colonial order, the ensuing

wars, and the new political frameworks for the definition of authority undermined the grounds upon which colonial authorities reigned, while economic and social elites at large were also subject to the convulsions of the day. In that context, the dismantling and reconstruction of political order was not a straightforward event but, rather, an intricate and conflicting process in which, Halperin Donghi convincingly argues, new leaderships took shape. In this regard, there was a deep break with the colonial era, and despite connections and continuities with the imperial past, the revolution brought about decisive innovations in the realm of politics and a wide renewal of political personnel, not just for the River Plate but for the whole of Spanish America.[3]

By the 1820s, the men who had managed to rise to a position of leadership struggled to acquire, keep, and reproduce political power, while others tried to enter the game. The former were a variegated lot with different personal and political stories and trajectories, but most of them had fought the material and symbolic wars that culminated with independence. From then on, the initial choice for republican forms of government provided a broad framework within which the leadership conducted the normative debates on the organization of the polity, shaped its institutional edifice, and headed practical political action. Their daily options in this regard would further mold political life in each of the republics, in ways that generally proved to be quite dynamic. By focusing upon elections, armed citizenship and the militia, and public opinion, we have seen how the norms, institutions, and practices changed throughout the century and affected the definition and exercise of citizenship. They also had important consequences for the leadership, and together with other dimensions of politics, they contributed to some long-term trends in the shaping of the "few."[4]

The turbulence of revolutions and wars brought about both a renewal and an enlargement of the leadership: new and more men were attracted to politics. They came from different social and cultural backgrounds, well beyond the circles that had nurtured the colonial elites. The abolition of the caste system, the nobility titles, and the qualifications related to *limpieza de sangre* (racial purity) meant that the formal stratifications of the Old Regime were left behind. Social and cultural differences, however, did not disappear, and despite the widespread proclamation of the principle of equality, hierarchies of various sorts continued to prevail during the whole century. An ingrained and long-lasting partition distinguished *gente decente* or *gente de bien* and *plebe*, but as the century advanced, this two-tiered system lost its descriptive and value-charged effectiveness. The social structure was reshaped, as new and different social groups defined the pyramidal representation of a modern society.

In politics, however, social stratifications did not necessarily carry force. At a time of great social and political commotions, like the one experienced by Spanish America at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the established links between those spheres easily fall apart. In this case, the combined effects of the crumbling of the old order, the circulation of new values, and the opportunities that arose for the creation of fresh leadership opened the way to a greater autonomy of the political sphere vis-à-vis the social realm. Elaborate and changing relations connected both spheres of human action, but the political was in no way automatically subordinated to the social, and the internal hierarchies of the former cannot be subsumed in those of the latter.

The postrevolutionary leaderships came mostly from the ranks of the *gente decente* widely considered—a social category whose borders were in flux. The possession of some property

and education plus the peers' recognition of an honorable way of life remained relevant features to qualify. Race played a role but the former proscription of *castas* (mixed bloods) was effectively abolished, and in fact, quite a few of the top political leaders qualified as *mestizos* and *mulatos*.[5]

To enter politics a certain amount of social and cultural capital helped, but wealth, connections, and education alone did not make a leader. Opportunities arose from the material extension and functional complexities of the newly created political networks, for those men who could deploy the resources and abilities needed to carry out the tasks demanded by republican politics—such as command troops and win wars, coordinate and mobilize electors, court and direct public opinion, and so on. This scenario demanded an increasing specialization for those devoted to politics—regardless of how they made a living. They could be *rentiers* and members of wealthy families that provided for their material needs, but more often than not they were originally practicing lawyers (the main profession among politicians), priests (particularly important in the aftermath of independence), teachers, publicists, merchants, hacendados, government employees, and professional military, among other occupations considered "honorable" by contemporaries.

The presence of numerous generals, commanders, brigadiers, captains, and colonels is often seen as a symptom of the presumably dominant role of the military in Spanish American politics. Yet for most of the nineteenth century, those titles resulted from the widespread involvement of men coming from different professions and occupations in armed conflicts where they received their ranks. Few of them, however, were career officers. The formation of professional armies with strict discipline, established hierarchies, and internal solidarities came late in the century, so that most of the so-called military did

not belong to a specific, self-identified, corporate group. As we have already mentioned, access to and command of armed resources was a decisive asset for aspiring political leaders, but these did not need to be professionals to succeed in that enterprise.

Decentralization was another relevant factor in the constitution of leaderships. Different causes favored this tendency. The collapse of the colonial territorial organization produced a dismemberment of sorts, where localities of different size and former status claimed to recover and retain their sovereign powers. Political life resurfaced and took shape at that level, and for a long time, resisted the attempts on the part of centralizers to rein it in. Later in the century, the strengthening of national scenarios did not put an end to the more restricted ones, particularly as regards political practices. Thus, for example, electoral and militia networks, as we have seen, had strong local and regional groundings. This overall situation opened opportunities for men from the provinces or from municipalities far away from the centers of economic and cultural power, who could thus join the ranks of the political leadership.

The ascent of regional caudillos fits this picture: they were men who proved capable of mounting powerful political machines—involving military force, electoral potential, and personal charisma—at the local level and eventually connect to larger networks of power. In the existing literature on Latin American politics, the figure of "caudillo" has occupied center stage, associated with the militarization of the revolutionary era and its aftermath.[6] The image of the unruly warlord who exerted command and influence upon his retinue and imposed his arbitrary rule over a specific area under his control started to circulate already in the nineteenth century. During the struggles of the postrevolutionary decades, contemporaries ap-

plied the term to criticize such leaders as Facundo Quiroga, in the River Plate; Manuel Belzú in Bolivia; José Antonio Páez, in Venezuela, or José Gervasio Artigas, in Uruguay, among many others, for their presumably uncivilized style of leadership, based on personal power, military might, and no regard for institutions. After the wars, which had bred *caudillismo*, Spanish America could not supersede this type of rule and, in contrast to more politically stable areas of the Western world, where civilian leadership was the norm, it remained caught in this refractory, antimodern system.

Later scholars recovered this nineteenth-century view, and, in conceptualizing *caudillismo*, they mostly retained—with few variations—the basic features put forward by contemporaries. In recent years, historians have questioned different aspects of that conventional interpretation, particularly in regard to its presumably archaic nature. Rather, they have reinserted caudillos in the complex webs of political transformations brought about—precisely—by the transition to modernity. The long years of war empowered certain figures that succeeded in mobilizing men for the armies and in gaining their support and following. They could put this capital to good use in the struggles for power characteristic of the decades of nation-building, but in that new context, military might and personal charisma were not enough. Continued success in politics meant that they entered into the more elaborate networks of republican life, which included norms, institutions, and practices at the local level but also connections with the rest.

Caudillos had to be politicians, but not all politicians were caudillos. As the century advanced, the word lost its specificity and was applied largely to strong personal leaderships, usually with negative connotations. Also, the fabric of politics showed increasing complexity, and required new skills and resources

different from those that caudillos had mastered in the past. Decentralization remained, however, a long-lasting trait of nineteenth-century political life, particularly at the level of practices, but national articulation became more and more important and, although those aspiring to positions of high leadership generally started their careers locally, they could only get to the top once they reached a national standing.

Within this context of renewal, expansion, and decentralization of political leaderships, the "few" were, in fact, not so few, but recruitment was far from being universal. More so than the existing legal restrictions to occupy government posts, it was the nonexplicit sociocultural frontiers that limited the access to the ranks of leader politicians. Politics demanded resources and connections not available to all citizens. The borders were porous and variable, but perceptible to all. At the same time, below those men at the top, the new political structures included a large number of intermediaries, successive links in the chain that connected the main figures with the rank and file. At these levels, recruitment went well beyond the social limits of the *gente decente* to include men from the wide plebeian world, and later in the century—when this initial division waned—from the increasingly differentiated middling sectors of society. These social differences, however, were not necessarily replicated in the political realm, which had its own internal stratification.

Thus, politicians became almost a class in themselves, with their own hierarchies and protocols. They had connections to the social and economically powerful, and often entered into the same social circles, but they were not their natural offspring or their unconditional pawns. In tune with republican traditions, those at the top prided themselves to be an aristocracy of sorts, an elite, not on account of material wealth or

hereditary status but rather, on their merits and virtues as "best men" of the nation. Their power came from different sources, not least among them, those that derived from their ability to appeal to the many.

The Sovereign People

Since the early days of the nineteenth century, in Spanish America the sovereign people was considered the ultimate source of political authority. It was an abstraction that evoked, at the same time, the unitary character of the principle of sovereignty and the plurality of individuals voluntarily come together through the *pactum societatis*. In the process that led to the formation of the new polities, this abstraction materialized into the actual people who became an indispensable presence in the political landscape. From then on, individuals living within a particular political community enjoyed certain rights considered "natural" and therefore "universal," while at the same time not all of them were entitled to the other set of rights that were more specific—among them, political rights. The definition of who enjoyed what, that is, of the extent and limits of citizenship in its various forms, was a matter of continual debates and disputes within each polity. That was the case with political and civil liberties in Spanish America, as the new republics established the conditions of citizenship, and thus demarcated the theoretical limits of the universe of the significant "many."

In all of Spanish America, the criteria for the definition of citizenship and its boundaries followed a similar course throughout most of the century, with few exceptions and local variations. The enthusiastic adoption of that institution in the aftermath of the revolutionary era aimed at shaping a pol-

ity based upon the equality of its members, thus putting an end to the strongly stratified colonial social order. Citizenship introduced, however, new differences among the people, according to their rights and obligations. In the early days of the republics, these were widely extended among the male population, so that a majority of the free, nondependent, adult men were formally citizens. But there were also many who did not enter into this category, as we have seen in chapter 2. From then on, this initial demarcation experienced changes, toward both contraction and expansion, but throughout the best part of the nineteenth century, the normative boundaries of political citizenship remained relatively broad for males—that is, compared to most European countries and even some areas of the United States—while civil liberties were widely recognized, albeit subject to the ups and downs of political fluctuations.

In principle, legal frameworks entitled individuals to exercise their rights and take part in the political life of the republic; among them, those related to the three dimensions described in former chapters: elections, armed citizenship, and public opinion. As we have seen, citizenship opened the way for the inclusion of most adult men into the militia and electoral networks, while civil liberties entitled many more—including women and dependent males, as well as nonnationals—to engage in the public sphere. Actual participation shows that the people made use of their rights in various degrees and forms. Thus, patterns of involvement differed across time and space, as well as according to other factors, including age, gender, social and cultural backgrounds, and place of residence. A very broad overview points to the strong representation of young adult men from the popular classes—both urban and rural—among voters and militiamen, while a wider spectrum took part in other instances of electoral events as well as in the

encouragement and material support of the militia's displays and actions. The people joining what we now call the "public sphere" were even more varied, with a visible commitment of the urban middling sectors and the literate, but also with the presence of women, children, slaves, and others not formally considered as citizens.

It is misleading, however, to focus on individuals, classified according to demographic and occupational attributes. In practice, political involvement was mainly channeled through collective mechanisms of participation, both formal and informal, and therefore, it is to those mechanisms that we should turn to observe politically engaged citizens in action.

Representative forms of government required that those who aspired to reach power win elections, and remain under the control of the people via armed citizenship and public opinion. These were the three main established forms of relationship between the many and the few, and although they were not the only means for the people to raise their voices or display their action in public, nor the only mechanisms for politicians to amass power, they remained indispensable parts of the political life of Spanish American republics throughout the nineteenth century.

Competition for power on the part of the few required the attraction, recruitment, organization, and deployment of followers and sympathizers. Electoral and militia networks had a relevant role in this regard and, I have argued, these did not result from the spontaneous initiative of individual citizens but, rather, they were the outcome of the sustained work of politicians of different levels, from the top leaders down to the local brokers. Despite their many differences, most of these networks were stratified structures where the rank and file occupied the lower levels. Therefore, they were at the same time

highly inclusive and strongly hierarchical organizations, where asymmetric relationships and exchanges prevailed. This verticality should not lead us to presume, however, that those who participated were just cannon fodder in the disputes among the powerful. Examples abound to show that, in most of the known cases, members responded to different motivations and incentives, while subordination seldom implied subservience. Their commitment to a leader, a local boss, or a party depended upon many factors, among which coercion played mostly a minor role. As we have seen, there were material and symbolic retributions for those joining in a partisan network, which in many ways also operated as an instance of protection and belonging. Ideological affinities and shared sensibilities, extended family and friendship ties, and the actual experience of political action often cemented the links among the membership. Asymmetry did not preclude agency, and those at the bottom of the pyramid could and did use their place to negotiate and claim, as well as to put their own views and opinions in circulation, both individually and collectively. Within this very general framework, there were many differences among regions and periods, from the strongly patriarchal and deferential patterns that prevailed, for example, in the rural areas of Chile to more porous and flexible relationships found in other settings, such as parts of Mexico and Colombia during the liberal years after the midcentury, among other possible arrangements.[7]

The wide range of institutions and practices related to public opinion offers a rather different picture from the one just portrayed for electoral and militia networks. Uniform patterns of organization are harder to find among the participants of traditional and new associations, the newspaper publics, and the many types of mobilizations that claimed to embody and represent public opinion. By the middle of the century, the

people involved were probably more numerous and diverse; their participation more autonomous; their bonds looser and maybe more egalitarian, although not free from hierarchies and discriminations. At the same time, these webs stemming from civil society partially overlapped with partisan networks, and although contemporaries—and later scholars—portrayed the former as the virtuous opposite of the latter, more often than not they were tightly intertwined in the complex fabric of republican politics.

Altogether, then, polities founded upon the principle of an equal people generated spaces of political involvement that were at the same time inclusive and stratified, that is, unequal. The formal (and informal) incorporation of large sectors of the population to the political life of most Spanish American republics did not equate with the establishment of an egalitarian polity. Republican political practices created and reproduced inequalities, not because they were devised to exclude (as scholars frequently have argued) but rather because inclusion took place in strongly hierarchical contexts of participation. Thus, egalitarian norms did not materialize in egalitarian institutions or practices. The introduction of popular sovereignty and the principle of political equality was a key revolutionary gesture aiming at the erosion of the strongly stratified world typical of colonial society. But the incoming order generated its own political hierarchies, which differed from the previous ones, as well as from the new and changing patterns of social stratification. Indeed, the vertical components found in the electoral, military, and civic networks did not replicate those of the social structure—although they could partially overlap—rather, they resulted from the political dynamics, its practices and institutions.

At the same time, social belonging (class), ethnicity, and gender played their part in the novel hierarchies inasmuch as

those dimensions were embedded in the normative frameworks and within the actual political practices. Thus, gender distinctions were explicit: women were formally excluded from the vote and the militia and had a relatively marginal role in the public sphere. Men from the laboring classes, in turn, were included but for the most part subordinated to a leadership that, though recruited from a relatively ample social spectrum, predominantly came from the better-off. Ethnic considerations were as good as erased from the norms, but they partially lived on in everyday life. There was a high correlation, moreover, between social class and race, and although not all "Indians" and particularly not all mestizos or mulattoes were lower class, most of the indigenous groups were peasants, while the majority of Afro-Americans belonged to the laboring sectors. Even if the borders between class and race were porous, and involvement in politics could help men move across the social and ethnic divide, there were limits to such mobility, which was usually not disruptive enough to change the dominant patterns of social reproduction. Questions regarding these limits, as well as the ways in which class, ethnicity, and gender connect to political hierarchies, therefore, require further exploration.

These patterns of participation were not incompatible with the republican order; on the contrary, they were their creatures. In this context, tensions arising from the asymmetry between equality of rights and the inequalities resulting from the exercise of those rights were sometimes the cause of political disputes.[8] More often than not, however, these tensions did not get in the way of the legitimacy of the system. Nor was the predominance of collective forms of participation that left little room for individual autonomous involvement a cause for serious contestation, at least until the last quarter of the century when, as we shall see, this whole dynamic came under heavy criticism.

Partisan Networks

The involvement of the people in the political life of the Spanish American republics was not limited to the institutions and practices just described. These were, however, the main channels for the participation of the many in the struggles for power that punctuated the history of the nineteenth century. The numbers of those involved fluctuated greatly. In practical terms, the political networks set up to compete for power featured a variable number of men and to a lesser degree women from very different status and backgrounds engaged in collective forms of action. Political practices, therefore, cut across the social, ethnic, and cultural divides and shaped shared spaces of identification and belonging.

The fact that these mechanisms functioned along hierarchical lines led some scholars to dismiss their relevance for the majority of the people, particularly for the lower classes, and to read them as devises basically instrumental to the elites. In the last decades, historians attuned to the perspectives put forward by subaltern history and other versions of a "history from below" have proposed a very different and richer picture. They portray the "subaltern" participating actively in politics by advancing their own agenda. Whether in the context of the disputes among the elites, or by launching their own, autonomous actions, different popular groups contested the order imposed from above and fought to transform it. In this view, social and cultural cleavages find their way to the political arena; political identity is tightly tied to class and ethnicity, and the nineteenth century is seen as one more stage in the long-living struggle between the subaltern and the powerful. This perspective has brought to light important aspects of the political life of the Spanish American republics, such as the ample repertoire of popular collective actions that aimed at eroding and resisting

the existing social order. Subaltern agency did not preclude subalterns' participation in formal politics, and some of the best recent studies in this line of work explore their role within the liberal parties in Mexico, Peru, and Colombia during the second half of the nineteenth century. The emphasis lies, however, on the autonomy of the subalterns within the frameworks defined by elite politics, and on their capacity to define and put forward their own collective targets, always different from and usually opposed to those of their elite occasional partners.

The insistence upon the autonomy of the subaltern and their axiomatic opposition to the elites or the powerful, however, leaves aside a large part of the story of republican politics in Spanish America, which featured people from very different social and ethnic backgrounds joining in partisan networks that operated under shared political banners. Their participation raises the question of their commitment to parties and leaders. Why should we presume that the subaltern in those groups followed, by definition, their own collective agenda guided by their struggle against the established order? Why not ask if, alongside their respective social and cultural identities, they developed political attachments with their fellow partisans of different backgrounds? Members of an electoral club, a militia regiment, a civic association, and other similar bodies could develop strong links as a result of their shared political and public experiences, besides their respective social and cultural attachments. Party allegiance, loyalty to one or another caudillo, sustained support for a leader, fidelity toward a group, all merit close examination in each specific case, as political identities did not necessarily equate with social or ethnic belonging.

There are many examples that show subalterns (or plebeians) actively involved in political activity in very different sides of the political and the ideological spectrum, from con-

servatives to liberals, from federalists to centralists, and so forth, as well as among the following and supporters of competing leaders or circles within these larger constellations. Scholars have sometimes interpreted this fact as a symptom of the instrumental character of that involvement: subalterns took part in whatever side responded to their collective demands, regardless of their position in the partisan game the elites played. Yet it can also be an indication of actual commitment of individuals and groups originating in the popular classes to different parties and leaders through various forms of involvement, which could indeed include negotiation of collective interests but also affinity with ideas and programs; loyalty or deference to caciques, caudillos, and party bosses; bonds of shared political experience, and so forth. Case studies that explore the connections of specific social and ethnic groups to the institutions and practices of republican politics show a variety of situations in this regard, from the elaborate arrangements that connected some indigenous groups to republican politics to the more conventional deferential relations in rural societies to the relatively more open interactions typical of urban spaces.

As for those who participated actively in political networks but belonged to the *gente de bien* or *gente decente*, they also developed partisan attachments that did not necessarily correlate with their class background. Partisan politics was a dividing factor among the socioeconomic elites, as well as among the lower echelons of the well-to-do and the middling sectors of the social scale. Specific material interests could have an important place in defining party allegiances, but so did ideas, traditions, personal affinities, and partisan identities as well as fears and expectations. So, it is not exceptional to find members of the same family adhering to different parties, and even fighting on opposite sides in wars and revolutions.

Political leaders stemmed mainly from those sectors, and it was the fracture among them that fueled most of the struggles for power in nineteenth-century Spanish America. Actions from below—such as collective demands for land, rebellions against taxes, litigations in courts of law, petitions to the authorities, or other public displays—could sometimes challenge the powerful, but competition to reach and control overall positions of authority was basically conducted from above and featured partisan networks that vertically incorporated men and women from the rest of the social spectrum. These organized forms of political intervention did not develop into stable structures but remained, rather, flexible arrangements that brought together locally grounded leaders (of different levels) who could recruit and mobilize followers and sympathizers to participate in the political disputes of the day. This pattern changed gradually, and by the midcentury, political alignments showed signs of growing stability and territorial articulation. Quite often, as described in chapter 2, different regional and local partisan outfits converged within the loose framework of a few larger national political organizations increasingly known as "parties." These lacked the type of institutional buildup and legitimacy that came to define later-day parties and remained as rather flexible and variable networks of men and resources operating under a single umbrella in the political arena. They often featured as familiar actors in the public instances such as parliament and the press, thus creating collective forms of identification that transcended the local sphere. A few decades later, new developments led to a deep reassessment of the role of parties. From then on, as formally organized institutions, they became the accepted and desired mechanisms of association and the preferred means to channel opinions and interests within the political system. In this context, each party established internal rules and procedures,

regulated membership, and developed novel forms of recruitment and participation as well as tighter mechanisms of control, which inaugurated a new era in the ways of partisan involvement.

Competition and Conflict

Nineteenth-century Spanish American political life spelled conflict. In this regard, the new republics faced dilemmas that were similar to those confronted by previous experiences, such as the early republican United States as well as postrevolutionary France. A normative ideal of unanimity prevailed, which understood politics as an instance of production and expression of the common good that would guard these republics from the threats of divisionism and disbandment. Differences of opinion were presumably sorted out through rational debate that elucidated the collective will. From the very beginning, however, sheer competition for power among different groups set in and conflict followed, while existing institutional mechanisms were not prepared to channel that sort of antagonism. For several decades, contemporaries stuck to the founding principles, condemned partisan discord, and tried to bridge the gap between normative ideals and actual practices through constant experimentation—as we have seen throughout this book. Political rivalries, in turn, found many ways of expression, and resulted in recurrent confrontations, as contending forces resorted to all recognized means available, both formal and informal, in order to win.

Scholars have long discussed the causes of political antagonism among the few—ranging from very general and enduring issues, such as the ideological divide between conservatives and liberals or the divergences between centralists and federalists, to more circumstantial matters that fueled most of the

actual conflicts of the day. Regardless of the final reasons that may or may not explain why men with similar relatively privileged social and cultural backgrounds became political enemies, the fact is that their rivalries animated a dynamic, often turbulent, political life. During the best part of the century, governments were usually ephemeral, leaderships contested, territorial boundaries uncertain, and political regimes subject to successive changes. With few exceptions, the hegemonic projects that were successively tried in most republics failed, and those that succeeded experienced recurrent challenges to their rule. This political instability proved long lasting and raised persistent concern among nineteenth-century thinkers and publicists. Later scholars have in turn recovered that topic as part of a diagnosis that sees the turbulences of the era as failures specific to Latin American politics. Their respective frameworks, however, are very different.

At the time, contemporaries contrasted their experience with the ideal of the republic as a virtuous form of government and political organization and found it lacking. Actual competition for power and sustained antagonism among political actors ran counter to the paradigm of a unified polity. Different means were proposed to avoid "factionalism" as well as to manage partisan conflicts. Results remained controversial. Contemporaries were critical of solutions that did not match their republican values—such as restrictions to voting or to the autonomy of the militia—while at the same time they discussed those same principles and searched for new ways to curb instability and tame politics.

Twentieth-century scholars followed a different line of argument. They contrasted the virulence of nineteenth-century politics with the concept of "order" that came to prevail at the end of that century—as we shall see—and that still endures as a measuring rod to critically evaluate the period under study.

In this case, political "order" is associated with a predictable institutional regime with clear and undisputed rules for the legitimization and exercise of authority. Seen under this light, most of the nineteenth-century Spanish American republics were a failure, the result of an incomplete or defective political modernization.

At this point, I would like to propose a somewhat different interpretation of these experiences. Rather than flawed examples within the larger picture of modern republics, they may be read as deeply embedded in that tradition. Between the 1820s and the 1870s, the Spanish American republican political order was strongly shaped by a civic rhetoric that favored the *vita activa* of the members of the polity, a shared ideal that presided over the foundation of these regimes. Despite the founders' critical appraisal of the human resources available for their political venture, they put forward a relatively inclusive definition of male citizenship, which—together with the imperatives of war—resulted in a wide-ranging mobilization of different sectors of the population. For decades, this initial definition was reproduced with scarce variation as part of a political dynamic marked by the struggles for power among different political groups headed by the few but actively engaging the many. Partisan competition led to the organization and display of electoral forces, "citizens in arms," and popular demonstrations of different sorts, as well as to sharp rhetorical exchanges in the press, the legislative bodies, and other public arenas. Rituals, words, and symbols played their part in extolling civic involvement and in defying adversaries and enemies, while political action reinforced and renewed the vertical and horizontal bonds between those participating in partisan confrontations.

At a time when the centralization of state power was a highly contested proposition, political life was—with few ex-

ceptions—highly decentralized. Local and regional leaderships struggled to keep political power in their hands, a modus operandi that conspired against any attempt at creating an overall hegemonic instance of domination. The fragmentation of military forces—the double-tiered system of a standing army and militia with strong local roots—was at the heart of that system, and its persistence was strongly upheld by important segments of the ruling elites as well as by wider sectors of the population. This institutional and political pattern resulted in recurrent instability, which was not the outcome of the failure to play the game of the republic, but on the contrary, a result of a specific way of abiding by its rules.

Overall, the system was quite successful in creating and delivering legal authority, but the same principles and mechanisms that served to bestow legitimacy upon institutions and practices could also be deployed to challenge the results of their application. In the name of the "people," contemporaries contested elections and staged revolutions. With the adoption of the principle of popular sovereignty to found authority, transcendence was left behind, and once power came to be considered a human construct, uncertainty slipped in. The invention of the people sought to replace the divine right of kings, but the people were not above human intervention, and therefore, authority claims could easily be contested. Also, the norms and institutions were, themselves, subject to criticism, and to proposals for change, making them always precarious.

Uncertainty and instability were not exclusive to the Spanish American world. Republican experiences in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe offer several examples of the difficulties in establishing and reproducing legitimate authority within those kinds of regimes. In most cases, like those of France and later Italy and Spain, among others, republics proved short-lived and were replaced by other systems.

The United States, the most successful case, was not free from the same type of challenges, which were met by repeated institutional and political innovations that enabled the relatively peaceful processing of partisan antagonism. These, however, were insufficient to solve the deepest conflict of all, which cut the republic in two, triggered a long and bloody civil war, and was over only after one of the rival sides defeated the other in the battlefields. Important reforms to the republican regime followed this outcome and resulted in the consolidation of stable political order.

Spanish Americans, in turn, insisted on the initial basic patterns for fifty years, and although they also tried different ways to tame politics, it was only by the last decades of the century that they decidedly opted out of some of the former practices and embraced the tenets of a new order.

The Rules of the Game

During the core decades of the republican era, the unstable and unruly features of politics raised concerns among the ruling sectors, who were, at the same time, the architects and main beneficiaries of the existing political order. The initial revolutionary enthusiasm of the 1810s had encouraged the first steps toward the dismantling of the highly stratified colonial system and the creation of a more egalitarian basis for the new polities, while the necessities of war favored the mobilization of vast sectors of the people and their incorporation to armies, guerrillas, and their rear guard. After independence, the efforts to establish a new, republican, order triggered intense ideological debates as well as fierce political disputes. Already in the late 1820s and early 1830s, publicists and political leaders were alarmed by the turbulences of politics, which they attributed to different causes, from colonial heritage to

the nonvirtuous behavior of elites or to the unruly behavior of the populace.

Among the favorite normative measures to "civilize" politics were the introduction of restrictions to citizenship, through limitations to the suffrage (see chapter 2), the reduction or dismantling of militias (see chapter 3), and the censorship of the press (see chapter 4). More drastic solutions, however, were also tried, such as the concentration of all authority in the hands of a strong figure, very much in the classical tradition of republican dictators but also in the more local recent manner of caudillos. Others, in turn, advocated a return to some sort of corporate arrangement reminiscent of the Spanish colonial past. These were, of course, ideal models that never quite materialized, but figures such as Juan Manuel de Rosas in Buenos Aires and Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia in Paraguay, among others, may be associated with republican dictators, while early conservatives in Mexico and Colombia sought to reestablish a corporate order. Very few of these experiments of the first half of the century managed to curb political instability for more than a relatively short time. As this book has clearly shown, strong restrictions to citizenship rights and practices had limited effects, while most dictatorial and corporate regimes were frequently disturbed by political contestation.[9]

Around the midcentury, fresh ideas and proposals circulated in Spanish America, mostly introduced and sustained by self-defined "liberals" of various sorts, but which soon appealed to other sectors across the social as well as the political spectrum. In this new climate, several republics redefined their institutional organization following the tenets of constitutional liberalism and set up new rules, which confirmed the original republican values and practices, and at the same time sought to establish limitations to the exercise of government power.[10] The constitutions sanctioned in Argentina and Colombia in

1853, Mexico in 1857, Ecuador in 1861, Venezuela in 1864, all respond to this pattern. In that context, the abolition of slavery,[11] the end to Indian *tributo* (head tax),[12] the relative expansion of the suffrage, and a specific advocacy of civil liberties and the separation of powers prevailed. The disentailment of communal lands, belonging to the church or to indigenous peoples, was a highly controversial issue that was only partially enforced. This measure aimed mainly at dismantling all remnants of a corporate social order by reinforcing the individual right to private property. At the same time, it was part of a larger objective, that of limiting the social, economic, cultural, and political power of the Catholic Church—a contested proposition that aroused many passions. All these changes gave new vigor to political life, which experienced the relative enlargement of citizenship and popular mobilization, a development of the public means of collective action, and an expansion of armed resources.

In terms of the institutional organization, the new charters also established the rules for the definition and exercise of authority at the national level and its articulation with local powers, in designs that ranged from the federal model inspired by the United States to the centralized arrangements that found an important precedent in the Chilean constitution of 1833. These reforms succeeded in creating the basic institutions of a national administration as well as in regulating the relationships between the legislative, judicial, and executive powers.

In this new context, however, instability remained a prevailing feature in the political life of most republics. The persistence of rivalries that were played out in different scenarios continued to animate a brisk, often violent, display of competing forces. Liberals came to power in several places, but they were usually internally fragmented and also challenged by other political groups, particularly conservatives of various

sorts. In practical terms, partisan competition continued to rely upon the organized mobilization of men coming mainly from the popular classes under the aegis of deeply divided leaderships. The already established forms of political participation were partially modified, but the basic dynamics of confrontation persisted. More consistently than before, elections were the main road to public office; they were held regularly and frequently, convened a relatively limited but increasing number of voters, and gathered many more people around demonstrations of partisan force. The improvement of controls over procedures reduced arbitrariness at the polls, but they did not succeed in eradicating the use of force. At the same time, the development of electoral clubs and other forms of political association turned electoral conjunctures from one-time events into extended occasions for the display of partisan rhetoric, rituals, and actions. Newspapers produced and amplified political messages, together with the reproduction of images of candidates and public figures. They were part of a public sphere that gained increasing relevance after the midcentury and contributed to the repercussion of partisan disputes among a larger audience. Thus, for example, in the turbulent year of 1873 in Buenos Aires, the daily *La Tribuna* underscored the widespread appeal of partisan politics among the urban population:

> The young women today are annoyed by the light literature of the gossip columns. . . . They would rather read a large article on politics. . . . The same thing happens with kids at school. . . . The bootblacks and street urchins talk about electoral combinations. . . . A young man cannot visit a family without the girls of the house or their mother demanding he profess his political faith.[13]

Involvement in the public sphere or participation in public spaces through the periodical press, civic associations, street

demonstrations, and other collective forms of expression animated a vibrant civic life, particularly in the cities. Most of these practices related to the concerns of different sectors of civil society that put forward their own agendas, not void from political definitions but allegedly free from partisan intervention. In times of turbulence, however, the borders between these spheres of action blurred, so that their ordinary mutual connections intensified and left little room for autonomy.

Revolutions were some such occasions. From the 1850s to the 1870s, as we have seen, armed uprisings against the established authorities were frequent in most of the Spanish American republics. Efforts at institutionalization did not preclude the continuation of this form of political action, based on the traditional argument of the right and obligation to defend freedom in the face of despotism. Contested elections, with accusations of factionalism and fraud, remained a frequent cause for rebellion. Despite rising criticism that pointed to the material and human costs of *levantamientos*, these were enthusiastically advocated not only by sectors of the partisan leadership but also by many of their followers. The material bases for this practice, moreover, remained strong. These decades saw the affirmation of militia in the shape of the National Guard in most of these countries, as the expression of the principle of armed citizenship and, in the case of federal polities, as a means of enhancing state or provincial powers. The fragmentation of the armed forces—particularly the coexistence of militia and standing armies but also their territorial partitions—facilitated the access to military resources, indispensable to launch a revolution. This period was ripe with them, thus contributing to the recurrent instability of political regimes.

At the same time, the 1860s witnessed the first systematic attempts to curb military fragmentation in the context of conflicts that required a drastic modernization of the armies. War

on a new scale resulted from the French intervention and subsequent civil war in Mexico (1862–67), the Spanish occupation of the Chincha Islands in 1864–66, which was defeated by Peruvian and Chilean forces (supported also by Bolivia and Ecuador), and the bloodiest confrontation of them all, between 1864/65 and 1871, which involved Paraguay on one side and Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay on the other. At the end of the 1870s another large war broke out, this time pitting Chile against Peru and Bolivia. These conflicts were of a different magnitude than the usual internal struggles. The countries involved, therefore, soon had to face the fact of their military flaws, as well as the crude realities of large-scale violence. Divided forces, which lacked a central command and a coordinated leadership, could hardly meet the new challenges.

In the context of these wars, therefore, overall military organization was subject to practical changes. Standing armies acquired increasing importance, as governments made huge efforts to modernize them in terms of equipment, training, and hierarchical structure. Thus, they started to operate with greater efficiency than before, while militia forces were subordinated to their command and experienced increasing difficulties to sustain their autonomy. These changes did not amount to an overall eradication of the dual military system, but rather to recurrent debates and political disputes around these issues, as well as to discussions regarding the different alternatives. In fact, it was not until the following decades that in the context of wider changes in the relationships between politics and society, the coexistence of standing army and militia gave way to the predominance of the former and the dismantling of the latter. In the meantime, the militia continued to be a significant institution in the complex relationships between the many and the few that materialized popular sovereignty.

In short, the variations introduced after the midcentury in the norms and institutions of the republics added complexity to their political life, but they did not alter the basic patterns of the political practices that had prevailed since the 1820s for the exercise of citizenship and the legitimization of authority.

Fin de Siècle

By the 1870s, concerns regarding political instability grew stronger, and from then on, the whole edifice of the republican experiment described in this book came under heavy fire, both in the realm of ideas and in the empirical world of practices. In the last decades of the century, the Spanish American societies experienced important transformations at all levels.

Most countries were going through a relatively sustained process of economic expansion as they developed closer links with the world markets, while the social structure became more diversified and complex. New ideas circulated challenging old certainties. Among them, those put forward by positivism in its different versions were strongly influential. Politics, in turn, was at the center of an overall revision of the values and practices that had founded and shaped the republics. Political languages changed. A rising creed put forward a concept of order that favored stability and discipline, rather than the active mobilization typical of elections and revolutions of old. The advocates of that order attributed instability mainly to the fragmentation of authority as well as to the "factionalism" of a divided leadership and its reliance on a popular following with unruly or unpredictable behavior. They strove, therefore, to centralize authority in a strong national state that would monopolize the use of force, discipline the elites, and reshape the citizenry. Once they reached positions of power, they pushed

forward policies that went in those directions, and were often in consonance with the newly prevailing trends among sectors of the leadership and beyond.

Thus, as described in chapter 2, in some countries the right of suffrage was restricted, while in others those in power sought to strengthen controls from above. New ways of understanding politics favored the representation of different interests and opinions in the political realm, so that some sort of proportional mechanisms replaced the winner-take-all former system while parties now became a genuine and desired means of channeling the people's voice and vote. Competition among them was now considered legitimate, thus diminishing the tensions of electoral confrontation. This new type of party, furthermore, operated as a formal institution that introduced regulations to supervise both the leaders and the rank and file, and while it opened the door to a wider recruitment of followers than its predecessors, it also tightened the mechanisms for managing their actions.

Another pillar of the former model, the citizen in arms, became practically extinct. Militias and national guards were either eliminated or put under the control of increasingly centralized standing armies. The dual system that had produced and reproduced the fragmentation of the armed forces was dismantled, as military power concentrated in the professional armies, which featured as a decisive instrument of the national state (chapter 3). Revolutions, in turn, lost much of their former appeal, not only because of changes in the conceptual framework that had considered them legitimate but also on account of the mounting difficulties to gain access to military resources. Finally, the symbolic and ritual facets of armed citizenship that associated it with republican patriotic virtues withered away in the face of a new sort of national patriotism

that correlated with the army and the citizen soldier now recruited mainly through conscription.

Changes also happened in the public realm in tune with the transformations experienced by an increasingly multifaceted civil society and by a more sophisticated state apparatus. Publics multiplied, and their connections to politics followed different patterns with more variations than before, while efforts on the part of governments to control or discipline their voices and actions usually had limited success.

The transformation of these forms of popular participation in politics and of the institutions and practices that channeled the relationship between the many and the few were part of larger epochal political changes in the ways of the republic. These changes did not go unchallenged, as new social and political forces soon contested the incoming model. Their proposals and demands, however, were only marginally voiced in republican terms; rather, critics of the new system found arguments in socialist ideals and democratic theories to put forward their claims. The languages of class, interest, and race displaced the civic rhetoric that had prevailed in previous decades, while national identity discourse permeated republican patriotism and new forms of political action buried the old. These fin de siècle overall trends present in most of the Spanish American republics did not affect them evenly; rather, they opened diverging ways for the following century.

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Epilogue

FOR MOST OF the nineteenth century the Americas were a republican continent. After the severance of the colonial bonds, almost all of the newly formed independent states became republics, from the United States in the north to Chile and Argentina in the Southern Cone, and kept that form of government for good.[1] This experience was quite unique, as during that period, other systems prevailed around the globe. The Atlantic revolutions had challenged absolutism and succeeded in introducing new principles for the institution of society and the foundation of political authority. The sovereignty of the people replaced the divine right of kings in several European countries and opened the way to what we now call "political modernity" on both sides of the Atlantic. But this change did not go uncontested, and for many decades to come, absolutist rule prevailed in large parts of the world.

The Americas went the way of the new and became a vast testing field in the institution of forms of "living in common" attuned to the novel values. The United States had taken a bold step when it chose the form of government and, rather than following the British road to modernity via a constitutional

monarchy, it opted for the republic. This was a risky move, with few precedents in modern times. Revolutionary France soon followed, but only for a short period, as the political convulsions of the 1790s heralded the demise of the republic, and the establishment of Napoleon's imperial regime. When the time came for self-rule in Spanish America, the prevalent international trend was promonarchy, but that option was politically defeated there, and sooner rather than later the new polities endorsed the republican alternative.

Republics and constitutional monarchies came in many forms. Both systems displaced transcendence and understood the political as a human construct, but there was a fundamental difference between the two. In the face of the uncertainties generated by the lack of an ultimate—divine—reference for power, typical of the modern polity, the monarchy functioned as a unifying principle for the community and the monarch as the symbolic head of the realm that provided an anchor for the new order. The hereditary rule, moreover, offered an invariable and predictable mechanism for succession, while royal lineage embodied tradition and continuity with the collective past.[2] Republics, in turn, had no such moorings; the people were the first and the last instance in the institution of the polity and in the foundation of authority—and what they decided to build they could agree to dismantle. This fundamental conundrum was at the heart of the construction of republics, whose architects devised different institutional and practical means to instill certainty and stability into the new political order.

In this book, I have argued that the actual nineteenth-century republican regimes had different ways of facing the challenges posed by this common dilemma. Some of them, like the first and second French republics, did not manage to survive for long. Others, like the Spanish American ones, suc-

ceeded in time by experimenting with a diversity of norms, institutions, and practices throughout the century, in a sequence that was characteristically unstable. The United States, in turn, was a unique case of a highly original republic, which from its early days devised a series of political innovations that steered the regime in a relatively stable, long-term course with few—albeit critical—exceptions.

The story told in these pages helps illuminate the larger picture of political modernity around the world. It has focused on the making of the Spanish American republics in the post-colonial era when the territories that had been for over three centuries under imperial rule severed their colonial bond and entered into an unpredictable course of self-institution as new polities based on the principle of popular sovereignty. This was a double-tiered and simultaneous process, which involved not just the radical change of political regime but also the definition and redefinition of new sovereign entities that would soon claim their status as autonomous states. The political was at the core of nation-building, so that nation and republic became practically synonymous.

The option for republican forms of government led the nations-in-the-making into a long search for the definition of the basic rules, the main institutions, and the effective practical means of self-government. There were no fixed recipes to this end, and although past and present republican experiences could serve as examples to be avoided or emulated, Spanish Americans had to find their own way to sort out the many challenges posed by their initial choice. From the very beginning, as we have seen, the people played a decisive role in the foundation of the new nations and in the creation and legitimation of political authority. In this regard, the novel republics soon followed the path already taken by their recent predecessors and adopted representative forms of government. The abstract

principle of the sovereignty of the people was therefore materialized through very concrete institutions, such as elections, that were also common to most other modern polities. Yet the history of these forms of popular involvement in politics and of the relationships between the many and the few in this part of the world show also many differences with other experiences.

There is no single way of accounting for the peculiarities of Spanish American republican history, so that rather than proposing an ultimate explanation to the topic of the people in our republics, in this book I have tried a more limited exercise by focusing on the political. No doubt other dimensions of social life may help understand that history, but I argue that politics itself may offer some clues that are not reducible to any other instance. In particular, the "invention of the people" and the forms of inclusion and participation of the many in the life of the polity followed a peculiar course in Spanish America, which defined shared, albeit changing, patterns for most of the nineteenth century and across the region—regardless of the various ideological trends that alternatively prevailed in each particular nation, and of the institutional architecture of the successive regimes.

Those patterns resulted from the actual exercise of politics in the republic. From the past, colonial legacies left their marks, but they could scarcely compete with the recent intense experience of war, with its concomitant effects in terms of the dislocation of the existing order of things, the organization and display of military forces, and the widespread mobilization of the people. From then on, politics involved not just the minority of men who strove to reach positions of power in the new republics, but it involved large sectors of the population in significant, albeit usually subordinated, ways. This involvement followed certain established norms and institutional arrange-

ments, and materialized in a series of very concrete practices, which have been described through these pages. These mechanisms favored an intense, sometimes violent, political life. In a context of strong partisan rivalries, whereby competing leaders resorted to all available political means to reach and remain in power, popular mobilization for elections, revolutions, and different sorts of public expressions animated a political dynamic that was highly volatile. Contemporaries were often critical of the resulting political instability, and so they tried different ways to modify that hard fact. Attempts at renouncing to the basic forms of the current republican political life, however, were usually short-lived, and most of the time, these remained a common ground for the successive reforms, regardless of their diverse ideological inspirations. As long as Spanish Americans insisted on this attachment, they could only partially modify the state of things, which was not the result of the republic gone amiss but, rather, of a sustained commitment to some of its founding principles.

A radical turn in this regard took place during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when new forms of understanding and practicing (republican) politics challenged the ones that had prevailed for several decades. This move was in tune with more global trends in matters republican, with the many adjustments introduced in the United States' political life after the Civil War; the third and definitive adoption, in 1870, of the republic in France—quite different from its previous formulations—and the shift from empire to republic in Brazil, in 1889. These regimes shared with the Spanish American nations the concern for order and stability, an aim not always at hand but that they all sought to achieve in order to avoid the volatility so characteristic of republics in the past.

In this way, what I have called the "republican experiment" came to an end. Spanish American nations kept their republi-

can forms of government, but the rules of the game had changed. And even though change was also at the heart of the process of continuous political experimentation characteristic of the decades following independence—with its share of trial and error, uncertainty and unpredictability—a common political pattern developed and prevailed from the 1820s to the 1870s. This book has tried to identify the main lines of this pattern particularly in regard to a key dimension of republican regimes, the role of the people in the construction and legitimation of power. It has also pointed to the disarticulation of those modes of political participation that announced the beginning of a different type of polity as well as a distinctive "modality of existence of life in common." While in the past, republic and nation as virtual synonyms had been the locus of such common life, in the coming era they parted ways as the "nation" acquired strong cultural connotations and became the ideal incarnation of the community. From then onward and well into the twentieth century, all over the world nationalism became a more substantial, less contingent, reference than the political regime to amalgamate the collective. Thus, Spanish American nations no longer relied on the republic for their communal subsistence; in fact, each of them followed different political trajectories and often alternated republican forms of government with authoritarian regimes that ignored the traditions of self-government so widely cherished in the nineteenth century.

NOTES

Introduction

1. The word *experiment* has several meanings. Here, it is used in the sense made explicit in one of the definitions of the Oxford dictionaries: "A course of action tentatively adopted without being sure of the outcome." http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/experiment.

2. Rosanvallon (2003), 14 (see references for chapter 1).

3. Morgan 1988 (see references for chapter 1).

4. This book borrows heavily from a very large number of works on the political history of nineteenth-century Latin America as well as other areas of the world. Rather than including footnotes with long lists of titles, I have chosen to attach a list of references at the end of each chapter. Notes are only used for specific references.

Chapter One. New Republics at Play

1. These first juntas did not explicitly question the colonial authorities in place.

2. The loyalists called them "insurgents," but they called themselves "patriots."

3. Scholars have long associated this situation with the persistence of the corporate imaginaries of the ancien régime, whereby different parts (in this case, territorially grounded) demanded retroversion of sovereignty. More recently, this proliferation of territorial claims has rather been explained resorting to the principles of *ius naturalis* and *ius gentium*, which were invoked in most of the disputes regarding the boundaries of the sovereign claims.

4. Manin 1997.

5. Manin (1997), 170.

Chapter 2. Elections

1. This is a revised and extended version of a text in print included in Eduardo Posada-Carbo and Andrew Robertson, eds. Forthcoming. *The Oxford Handbook of Revolutionary Elections in the Americas, 1800–1910*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2. The Cádiz constitution was effective in the territories under the control of Spanish authorities during the "liberal" regimes of 1812 to 1814 and 1820 to 1823. These included the Viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru as well as the recon-

Chapter 5. The Republican Experiment: An Essay in Interpretation

1. The expression was coined by James Mill in 1835.

2. Halperin Donghi 1972.

3. There is a long-lasting controversy among scholars regarding the colonial heritage in Latin America.

4. I use here the term *leadership* to refer to the cast of characters who played directive roles in the political life of the republics, both in government positions and in partisan activities. In choosing this descriptive term, I have left aside more precise concepts used by scholars addressing similar problems, such as political class, elites, oligarchy, governing class, notables, and so on. Thus, rather than entering into a conceptual discussion of categories for specific periods and places, I wish to propose some very general features that apply to all.

5. Such was the case, among many others, of Benito Juárez in Mexico, Manuel Belzú in Bolivia, and Agustín Gamarra in Peru, who reached the presidency of their respective countries.

6. Later on, and until today, the term has been applied, by extension, to name political leaders with personal charisma and popular following, both by critics and advocates of that type of leadership.

7. In the case of indigenous groups, there is a specific bibliography that discusses their involvement in the formal political struggles in various periods and places. For an elaborate consideration of this topic see, among many others, Caplan 2010; Mallon 1995; Falcón 2016; Guardino 1995, 1996, 2005; Méndez 2005, 2006; Thomson 1990, 1998, 1999, 2010; Alda Mejías 2002; and the edited volumes by De Jong and Escobar Ohmstede 2016, and Irurozqui 2005.

8. See, for example, the case of the *Sociedad de la Igualdad* in Chile in James Wood (2011), or that of the *Sociedades democráticas* in Colombia in Francisco Gutiérrez (1995).

9. The most consistent exception was that of Paraguay, where Francia ruled as formally designed dictator from 1814 to his death in 1840. He was succeeded then by Carlos Antonio López—first as consul and then as president—until his own death, in 1862, followed by his son Francisco Solano López, who was killed in battle while still in power, toward the end of the War of the Triple Alliance, in 1870.

10. There is a vast bibliography and an ongoing debate on liberalism in Latin America, which I have chosen not to address in this book focused on institutions and practices rather than ideologies.

11. See chapter 2, note 10.

12. *Tributo indígena* was formally eliminated earlier in most countries, but in some of them, it was later reestablished or replaced by a similar type of taxation. Laws abolishing head tax were passed in Argentina, Paraguay, Mexico (only enforced later on), and Chile during the 1810s; in Venezuela and most of the

Central American republics in the 1820s; in Guatemala and Colombia in the 1830s; in Ecuador and Peru in the 1850s; and in Bolivia in the 1870s.

13. *La Tribuna*, July 27, 1873, cited in Sabato 2001.

Epilogue

1. The main exceptions were Brazil, a constitutional monarchy from 1822 to 1889, and Canada, a territory governed by the English until 1867, when it achieved self-rule within the British Empire under the figure of the "dominion." Mexico had a short experience with the monarchy in 1821–23 and later on, from 1864 and 1867.

2. I thank Marcela Ternavasio for her observations in this regard.